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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joseph Luther Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count of felony robbery. The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. Mr. Jacobs filed 
an untimely notice of appeal. He also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 
35) motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the district court denied. 
Mr. Jacobs subsequently began the present post-conviction proceeding. In his 
amended petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Jacobs asserted that he was entitled to 
post-conviction relief because his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. In 
Count One of the amended petition, Mr. Jacobs asserted that there had been ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental 
health evaluation. If the district court had received another mental health assessment 
containing additional evidence concerning Mr. Jacobs' mental health, that would have 
affected the district court's sentencing and Rule 35 decisions. In Count Two of the 
amended petition, Mr. Jacobs asserted that there had been ineffective assistance of 
counsel because his trial counsel had not filed a timely appeal, although he had 
informed his trial counsel that he wanted to file an appeal of his sentence. 
The district court gave notice of its intent to dismiss Count One of the amended 
petition. Mr. Jacobs submitted a reply to the notice of intent to dismiss. In the reply, he 
reiterated that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel because of his trial 
counsel's failure to challenge his original mental health evaluation. He also asserted 
that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence 
that would require vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice. The district court 
1 
rejected those assertions and summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of the 
amended petition. The parties then stipulated that there was good cause to grant 
Mr. Jacobs relief on Count Two of the amended petition, and the district court held that 
he was entitled to reentry of judgment in the underlying criminal case and to file a timely 
appeal in that case. 
On appeal, Mr. Jacobs asserts that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing with prejudice Count One of the amended petition, because he presented 
prima facie evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the sentence 
in the interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence that there had been ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental 
health evaluation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count of felony robbery, and the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.4, 51-53.) He 
filed an untimely notice of appeal. (R., p.53 & n.3.) He then filed an Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the district court denied. 
(R., pp.53-54.) 
Mr. Jacobs subsequently filed, prose, a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction 
Relief. (R., pp.4-12.) After Mr. Jacobs requested the appointment of counsel, the 
district court appointed counsel to represent him in all proceedings involving the post-
conviction petition. (R., pp.13-16, 22.) The State then filed an Answer to Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.24-27.) Mr. Jacobs requested leave to amend his 
petition for post-conviction relief, which the district court granted. (R., pp.47-50.) 
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In his Verified Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Mr. Jacobs asserted 
that he was entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel had rendered 
ineffective assistance. (Confidential Exs., pp.2-9.) 1 In Count One of the amended 
petition, he asserted that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel "in the 
processes of his sentencing and Rule 35 of his case and on newly discovered 
information related to the same." (Confidential Exs., p.3.) Mr. Jacobs's I.C. § 19-2524 
mental health evaluation concluded that he "does not currently meet criteria for mental 
health diagnosis." (Confidential Exs., p.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 
Mr. Jacobs did not have adequate time to fully discuss his mental health evaluation, the 
presentence report, or the sentencing process with his trial counsel. (Confidential Exs., 
p.3.) 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Jacobs's trial counsel stated that she disagreed 
with his mental health evaluation "because my lay opinion is that this is a young man 
who also suffered from some significant depression issues." (Confidential Exs., p.4 
(internal quotation marks omitted).) Mr. Jacobs contended that, while his trial counsel 
stated that she had concerns with the accuracy of his mental health evaluation, she 
made no efforts to obtain another mental health assessment or advise Mr. Jacobs that 
he could seek an independent mental health assessment. (Confidential Exs., p.4.) 
Similarly, when his trial counsel filed the Rule 35 motion, she did not speak with 
Mr. Jacobs about obtaining an independent mental health assessment, and she did not 
offer any factual basis to argue against the original mental health evaluation. 
1 The Verified Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief was filed under seal 
pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i). (Confidential Exs., p.2.) 
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(Confidential Exs., pp.4-5.) Mr. Jacobs's trial counsel also did not try to obtain 
information from Mr. Jacobs's mother regarding his mental health history. (Confidential 
Exs., p.5.) 
Mr. Jacobs noted that his Comprehensive Mental Health Evaluation, completed 
at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) after sentencing, stated, "His thoughts [and] 
speech indicate a lot of psychosocial stressors as it pertains to his sentencing and 
crime. He is less likely to reach out to others as evidenced by past psycho-social 
[history] for professional advice or help. Some of this may relate to culture." 
(Confidential Exs., p.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original); see 
Confidential Exs., pp.59-60.) Further, the ICC mental health assessment stated, "He 
struggles with interpersonal skills but he appears to have good self-management [and] 
high level of intellect ... Inmate is capable of making informed / educated decisions. 
This said, it is possible that [Inmate's] judgment could have been impacted [and] 
compromised in a homeless [and] unsteady environment." (Confidential Exs., pp.5-6 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original); see Confidential Exs., p.60.) 
Thus, Mr. Jacobs asserted that his trial counsel, "in failing to challenge the 
mental health assessment and by failing to advise that Petitioner could challenge the 
mental health assessment both at the time of sentencing and in making his Rule 35 
motion, was ineffective as Petitioner's counsel." (Confidential Exs., p.6.) If his trial 
counsel had "adequately advised Petitioner and taken reasonable steps to obtain 
another mental health evaluation and Petitioner's mental health history, Petitioner's 
mental health at the time of the crime and at sentencing would have come forth and 
4 
would have aided Petitioner in his sentencing and/or Rule 35 Motion." (Confidential 
Exs., p.6.) 
In Count Two of the amended petition, Mr. Jacobs asserted that there had been 
ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel had not filed a timely appeal, 
although Mr. Jacobs had informed his trial counsel that he wanted to file an appeal of 
his sentence. (Confidential Exs., pp.6-7.) 
In the amended petition's prayer for relief, Mr. Jacobs requested that he be 
resentenced and allowed an opportunity to present an independent mental health 
evaluation and history, and that he be allowed to file an appeal of his sentence in the 
underlying criminal case. (Confidential Exs., p.7.) 
The district court then filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, informing Mr. Jacobs 
that it intended to dismiss Count One of the amended petition. (R., pp.51-62.) 
According to the district court, Count One raised the question of "whether the petitioner 
at or before the time of sentencing had a mental illness or mental health disorder that 
was not properly diagnosed in the MHA [(mental health assessment)] submitted for the 
[court's] consideration for sentencing," as well as "whether the petitioner having 
submitted to another MHA would have [been] properly diagnosed [with] a previously 
undiagnosed mental condition or disorder that would have been relevant at the time of 
sentencing or at the time of his Rule 35 motion." (R., p.56.) 
The district court mentioned that the original mental health evaluation considered 
at the time of sentencing determined that Mr. Jacobs was not suffering from any mental 
illness at the time of the evaluation. (R., pp.56-57.) The district court then stated that 
the mental health assessments performed at ICC, while they reported that Mr. Jacobs's 
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"thoughts and speech indicate a lot of psychosocial stressors as it pertains to his 
sentencing and crime," found that he presented with "stable mental health" and 
concluded that he had no need for a further mental health referral. (R., p.57 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Confidential Exs., pp.59-60, 63-65.) 
The original mental health evaluation considered by the district court recognized 
"the 'psychosocial stressors' that the petitioner may have been experiencing at the time 
of the crime, i.e., homelessness, lack of money, and inability to maintain employment." 
(R., pp.57-58.) At sentencing, the district court "acknowledged that it is likely 
[Mr. Jacobs] was depressed over the lack of money and a job, but the court also 
indicated that situation was the result of the petitioner's own actions and not the result of 
any mental illness." (R., p.58.) 
The district court stated that "there is no legal or factual showing that the [mental 
health] evaluation was in error or that it was not properly performed." (R., p.59.) The 
district court then determined: "The fact that counsel did not advise the petitioner to 
obtain another MHA is not deficient performance since there is no showing that 
presently that counsel knew of should have known of additional information that would 
have altered or changed the lack of a diagnoses of a mental illness." (R., p.59.) The 
ICC mental health assessments confirmed "that he does not have a diagnosis of mental 
illness, other than some 'psychosocial stressors' that were noted in the original MHA 
used at sentencing." (R, p.59.) 
With regard to the requirement that Mr. Jacobs show that he was prejudiced by 
his trial counsel's failure to order another mental health assessment, the district court 
stated that he would have the "burden to prove that had a second MHA had been 
6 
ordered that the results of the MHA would have been altered or change[d] the sentence 
imposed by the court or that his Rule 35 motion would have been granted." (R., p.59.) 
The district court determined that it had the same information that it considered during 
sentencing and at the time of the denial of the Rule 35 motion, and thus "[Mr. Jacobs's] 
'depression' was not the product of any mental illness or condition, it was the product of 
his own making .... " (R., p.60.) The district court concluded that Mr. Jacobs "has 
failed to present a prima facie case that counsel's performance at sentencing or her 
presentation of the Rule 35 Motion was prejudicial." (R., p.60.) 
Later, Mr. Jacobs filed a timely Petitioner's Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
(R., pp.71-78.) Mr. Jacobs asserted that he "has set forth a sufficient factual basis to 
show that Petitioner's underlying attorney was ineffective and that newly discovered 
evidence establishes facts that would have made an effect at Petitioner's sentencing." 
(R., p.72.) Alongside the assertion that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
challenging the original mental health evaluation, Mr. Jacobs asserted that he was 
entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence that would 
require vacating the sentence in the interest of justice. (R., pp.72-73.) 
With respect to the newly discovered evidence assertion, Mr. Jacobs asserted 
that the new information offered by the ICC mental health assessments was two-fold: 
"(1) that Petitioner's judgment could have been impacted and compromised in a 
homeless and unsteady environment; and (2) that Petitioner's culture and other factors 
relate to Petitioner's inability to seek help with psycho-social stressors." (R., pp.73-74.) 
Nothing in the original mental health evaluation "discusses the effect of the 
psychological stressors on the Petitioner's judgment at the time of the crime." 
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(R., p.74.) Thus, the information that Mr. Jacobs's psychosocial stressors could have 
impacted and compromised his judgment was new information relative to the sentence. 
(R., p.74.) Likewise, the information on Mr. Jacobs's culture and its influence on his 
inability to seek help with his psychosocial stressors was new information. (R., pp.74-
75.) 
Mr. Jacobs asserted that the new information was relevant to sentencing 
because it showed that the original mental health evaluation considered by the district 
court was incomplete, and it would have provided adequate grounds for the district court 
to find that treatment would rehabilitate him. (R., pp.75-76.) Thus, "Petitioner has 
established sufficient facts [so] as to justify proceeding forward in this matter." 
(R., p.76.) 
With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel assertion in Count One, 
Mr. Jacobs asserted that he could proceed because he had shown that his trial 
counsel's performance was deficient and that he had been prejudiced by that deficient 
performance. (R., p.76; see R., p.72.) His trial counsel had recognized that the 
information contained in the mental health evaluation considered by the district court 
was deficient or incorrect. (R., pp.76-77.) The deficiency existed because "the mental 
health evaluation fails to recognize a change of the Petitioner's mindset and inability to 
render effective judgment at the time Petitioner committed his crime." (R., pp.77-78.) 
Thus, Mr. Jacobs requested that the post-conviction proceedings continue on 
Count One of the amended petition, and that the district court hold a hearing on the 
matter for all issues raised. (R., p.78.) 
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The district court subsequently issued an Order Partially Dismissing Amended 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.79-83.) On the newly discovered evidence 
assertion, the district court concluded that Mr. Jacobs had not met his burden of 
showing that the district court had false, incomplete, or otherwise materially misleading 
information at the time of sentencing. (R., p.80.) The ICC mental health assessments 
and the original mental health evaluation were "substantially similar in their assessment" 
of Mr. Jacobs. (R., p.80.) Further, "[t]he fact remains that the defendant does not have 
any diagnosis of mental illness." (R., p.80.) Mr. Jacobs was not suffering from a mental 
illness when he committed the crime or at the time of sentencing. (R., p.81.) Thus, 
even if Mr. Jacobs's trial counsel had formally objected to the original mental health 
evaluation and obtained another mental health assessment featuring the information 
offered in support of the amended petition, "the sentence imposed by the court would 
not have been different nor would this court have granted the Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence." (R., p.81.) 
On the ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the district court concluded 
that Mr. Jacobs "has failed to present a triable issue of fact as to [Count One] that 
counsel was deficient in failing to object to the Mental Health Evaluation or in failing to 
obtain a new Mental Health Evaluation for the Rule 35 motion." (R., p.81.) According to 
the district court, "the psychological evaluations submitted in support of the amended 
petition for post-conviction relief are not materially different from the one relied upon at 
the time of sentencing." (R., p.81.) "Assuming that counsel were deficient (which is not 
the case herein), based on the evidence presented the petitioner has failed to establish 
any triable issue of fact as to the issue of prejudice." (R., p.81.) 
9 
Thus, the district court dismissed with prejudice Count One of the amended 
petition. (R., p.82.) The district court stated, "The only remaining issue for the 
evidentiary hearing is counsel's failure to file a timely notice of appeal." (R., p.82.) 
The parties then stipulated that there was good cause to grant Mr. Jacobs relief 
for Count Two of the amended petition, on the basis that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a timely appeal. (R., pp.88-89.) The 
district court issued a Judgment dismissing, with prejudice, Count One of the amended 
petition, and granting Count Two. (R., pp.90-91.) The district court held that Mr. Jacobs 
was entitled to the relief of the reentry of the judgment in the underlying criminal case, 
and that he had the right to file a timely appeal in that case. (R., pp.90-91.) 
Later, Mr. Jacobs filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.94-96.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of 
Mr. Jacobs' amended petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed, With Prejudice, Count One Of 
Mr. Jacobs' Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
Mr. Jacobs asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed, with 
prejudice, Count One of the amended petition, because he presented prima facie 
evidence that newly discovered evidence required the vacation of the sentence in the 
interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel 
on the basis of his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental 
health evaluation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 
(2007). Like any other civil plaintiff, a petitioner for post-conviction relief must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence the factual allegations upon which the application for 
post-conviction relief is based. Id. However, unlike a complaint in a normal civil action, 
"an application for post-conviction relief must include affidavits, records, or other 
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not 
included." Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the 
petitioner's evidence has not raised a genuine issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(b) 
and (c). "On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing," an appellate court "will determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
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exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits 
on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. "A court is required to accept the 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's 
conclusions." Id. "When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to 
relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing." 
Id. "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief 
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do 
not justify relief as a matter of law." Id. But if genuine and material factual issues have 
been raised, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906. 
Ne/Isch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 430 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Put otherwise, "[a] petition for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary 
dismissal if the petition has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as 
to each element of the claim upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." 
Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583 (2000). 
C. Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence That Newly Discovered Evidence 
Required Vacation Of The Sentence In The Interest Of Justice 
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence that newly discovered 
evidence required vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice. The ICC mental 
health assessments raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary 
dismissal, because they set forth evidence of material facts that would require vacation 
of his sentence under I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4). 
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Post-conviction relief is available where the application shows "[t]hat there exists 
evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of 
the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4). "An applicant 
must present evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that would have 
been relevant to the sentencing process and that indicate the information available to 
the parties or the trial court at the time of sentencing was false, incomplete, or otherwise 
materially misleading." Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 440 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The ICC mental health assessments report that Mr. Jacobs' "thoughts and 
speech indicate a lot of psychosocial stressors as it pertains to his sentencing and 
crime. . . . [l]t is possible that [Mr. Jacobs'] judgment could have been impacted [and] 
compromised in a homeless [and] unsteady environment." (Confidential Exs., p.60.) 
Thus, they contain evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that would 
have been relevant to the sentencing process and indicate the information available to 
the trial court at the time of sentence was incomplete. See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440. 
The facts in the ICC mental health assessments would have been relevant to the 
sentencing process. When the district court rejected Mr. Jacobs' newly discovered 
evidence assertion, it stated, "While it is true that [Mr. Jacobs] was suffering from 
'psychosocial stressors' at and prior to the commission of the crime due to his breakup 
with his girlfriend, lack of employment and his homelessness, these stressors do not 
excuse, mitigate or justify [Mr. Jacobs'] premeditation and planning of the crime to which 
he pied guilty to." (R., p.80.) However, the possibility that Mr. Jacobs' judgment was 
impacted and compromised by his psychosocial stressors is a mitigating factor. Without 
those stressors affecting his judgment, Mr. Jacobs would be less likely to repeat the 
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offense. Additionally, the stressors' effect on his judgment indicates that Mr. Jacobs 
could be rehabilitated if those stressors were removed or ameliorated. Thus, because 
the possibility that Mr. Jacobs' judgment was impacted and compromised by his 
psychosocial stressors is a mitigating factor, the ICC mental health assessments would 
have been relevant to the sentencing process. 
The facts in the ICC mental health assessments also indicate the information 
available to the trial court at the time of sentencing was incomplete. The presentence 
investigation report and the original mental health evaluation discussed Mr. Jacobs' 
psychosocial stressors. (Confidential Exs., pp.14, 17, 29, 31.) However, the evidence 
that Mr. Jacobs' psychosocial stressors could have impacted and compromised his 
judgment simply was not presented in the presentence investigation report or the 
original mental health evaluation. (See Confidential Exs., pp.10-19, 26-32.) Thus, the 
information available to the trial court at the time of sentencing was incomplete. 
In sum, the ICC mental health assessments contained evidence of facts that 
existed at the time of sentencing that would have been relevant to the sentencing 
process and indicate the information available to the trial court at the time of sentence 
was incomplete. Mr. Jacobs has demonstrated the existence of "evidence of material 
facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or 
sentence in the interest of justice." See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440. Mr. Jacobs 
therefore presented evidence establishing a prima facie case that he is entitled to post-
conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, which is sufficient to survive 
summary dismissal. See Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583. Because Mr. Jacobs set forth 
evidence of material facts that would require the vacation of his sentence under 
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I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4), the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Count One 
with respect to the newly discovered evidence assertion. See Knutsen, 144 Idaho 
at 442. 
Thus, Mr. Jacobs is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he 
can demonstrate that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented 
and heard, that requires a resentencing hearing. See id. at 444. The district court's 
order summarily dismissing Count One of the amended petition should be reversed, and 
the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs is 
entitled to resentencing in light of the ICC mental health assessments. See id. 
D. Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of The Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Based On His Trial Counsel's Failure To Challenge The Original Mental 
Health Evaluation 
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental 
health evaluation. A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel will "survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner 
establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was 
deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced 
petitioner's case." Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho at 583. 
The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the State of Idaho is 
guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617 (2011). An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may properly be brought under the UPCPA. Id. 
Under the two-part Strickland test, "[t]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
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claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that 
the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency." Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004)). To establish 
a deficiency, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 (2010). To 
establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different but for the attorney's deficient performance. Id. 
Mr. Jacobs asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to challenge the original mental health evaluation. "An ineffective assistance claim 
based on counsel's failure to present evidence cannot satisfy the deficient performance 
or resulting prejudice prongs without providing the substance of the potential testimony 
or other admissible evidence of facts counsel should have discovered and presented." 
Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443. 
Mr. Jacobs has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his trial 
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable in failing to challenge the original 
mental health evaluation. As discussed above, the evidence from the ICC mental 
health assessments indicated that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been impacted and 
compromised by his psychosocial stressors. (Confidential Exs., p.60.) This evidence 
would have been pertinent to the district court's examination of the mitigating factors 
during sentencing and while ruling on the Rule 35 motion. The evidence from the ICC 
mental health assessments could have been presented at those junctures, had 
Mr. Jacobs' trial counsel challenged the original mental health evaluation and obtained 
another mental health assessment. Thus, Mr. Jacobs' trial counsel's failure to 
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challenge the original mental health evaluation "raises a material question regarding the 
vigor and competence of his counsel's representation." See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443. 
Mr. Jacobs also raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental health 
evaluation. The prejudice prong of the Strickland test only "requires a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's inadequate performance, the outcome would have 
been different." Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. The possibility that Mr. Jacobs' 
judgment could have been impacted and compromised by his psychosocial stressors 
would have served as an important mitigating factor for Mr. Jacobs' sentence. There is 
a reasonable probability that evidence would have prompted the district court to impose 
a lesser sentence. See id. at 444. Thus, the district court erred in denying Mr. Jacobs 
an evidentiary hearing on whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to challenge the original mental health evaluation. 
In short, Mr. Jacobs presented prima facie evidence of the ineffective assistance 
of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental health 
evaluation. See Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho at 583. The evidence that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him is sufficient to survive 
summary judgment. See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 444. The district court erred when it 
summarily dismissed Count One with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
assertion. See id. 
Thus, the district court's order summarily dismissing Count One should be 
reversed, and the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether 
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Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing in light of his trial counsel's ineffective assistance. 
Seeid. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Jacobs respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the district court's order summary dismissing, with prejudice, Count One of his amended 
petition for post-conviction relief, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on 
whether Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing. 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2013. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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